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1 The new book from José  Medina offers  an inspiring exploration of  how the recent
discussions of “epistemic ignorance” can be put to work to unveil and denounce new
forms of  oppression.  José  Medina accomplish this  task  by combining four  different
tradition: American pragmatism, Wittgenstein, Foucault, and feminist and race studies.
This  original  blend  of  different  traditions  gives  the  book  its  distinctive  flavor  and
accounts for its originality.
2 One way to read this text is to see it as a book in political philosophy rooted in the
tradition of  nonideal  theory,  and therefore committed to a  wide concern for social
issues.  This  concern  is  formulated  in  an  explicitly  epistemic  tonality.  Medina  tries
indeed to work out some of the epistemological assumptions that according to him
underlie and perpetuate forms of social oppression. Put in a nutshell,  the idea is to
unfold the epistemic resources and obstacles involved in the normative dynamics by
which oppression is produced, reproduced, contested and finally overcome. To reach
his goal, Medina relies on the notion of epistemic injustice, recently introduced in the
philosophical  debate  by  Miranda  Fricker,  to  define  his  own  concept  of  epistemic
resistance. Starting from the assumption that there exists distinctly epistemic kinds of
injustice, and that oppression has a distinctive epistemic dimension, Medina defends
the idea that we need to explore the typical epistemic resources on which social actors
can rely to contrast the forms of social oppression affecting them.
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3 By “epistemic resistance,” the author means “the use of our epistemic resources and
abilities to undermine and change oppressive normative structures and the complacent
cognitive-affective functioning that sustains those structures” (3). Epistemic resistance
is clearly a political act, as it is addressed against injustices that are embedded in social
relations. This resistance model is introduced with the explicit aim of overcoming the
standard dualism between consensus models and agonistic models by relying on what
Medina  takes  to  be  a  broader  understanding  of  democratic  life  as  being  based  on
communicative engagements.
4 The political meaning of resistance developed by this book derives also from a second
source,  which  is  a  contestatory  conception  of  democracy.  Relying  on  works  from
Elizabeth Anderson and Iris M. Young, Medina assumes a model of democracy based on
the notion of resistance rather than on the notion of consensus. His main idea is that
“in  democratic  societies,  given  their  commitment  to  free  and  equal  epistemic
participation, there is a prima facie interest and obligation to detect and correct the
systematic disparities in the epistemic agency that different members of society can
enjoy  and  the  inequalities  associated  with  them”  (4).  The  obligation  to  combat
epistemic injustices derives therefore from the previous acceptance of an epistemic
justification of democracy. Contestation is an essential feature of democracy, and the
epistemic resistance refers to the epistemic and political mechanisms that sustain it.
5 Here  we  should  see  the  first  element  of  interest  for  pragmatists,  since  Medina,
following  Anderson,  considers  Dewey’s  experimentalist  account  of  the  epistemic
powers of democracy as the best instantiation of the resistance model, given – they
both contend – the central role Dewey assigns to contestation and dissent as central
virtues of democracy. According to both scholars, compared to other models, Dewey’s
is “the only model in which dissent is epistemically productive.” The importance of
epistemic  resistance  is  therefore  to  be  seen  within  the  framework  of  an  epistemic
justification  of  democracy:  democracy  is  the  only  regime  that  renders  conflict
epistemically  productive.  Thanks  to  this,  democracy  can  assign  a  positive  value  to
diversity, interaction, and dynamism: “it is because we want to exploit the benefits of
productive dissent that we need to recognize and take advantage of the heterogeneous
situated knowledge of diverse agents.”
6 Starting  from  these  broad  assumptions  Medina defines  the  two  normative
requirements that inform his understanding of democracy and that pave the way for
his analysis and critique of epistemic oppression and resistance. The first requirement
is the Expressibility Requirement: it “demands that the different groups that a social body
can contain have the opportunity to coalesce in a public with expressive capacities, so
that  they  can  articulate  their  shared  experiences  and  perspectives.”  Expressibility
requires that spaces and opportunities for group formation be provided. The second
requirement  is  the  Responsiveness  Requirement,  according  to  which  “the  social  and
epistemic conditions of communication and interaction be such that the expressions of
a public have the proper uptake by other publics and by society as a whole” (9). The
study of epistemic injustices is the study of how these minimum requirement can fail,
and of the negative effects on democratic life produced by these failures.
7 Medina’s focus is restricted to two specific forms of oppression which are racial and
gender inequality, to which Medina assigns a specific epistemic significance. Indeed,
“in contexts of sexual and racial oppression there are cognitive-affective deficits that
amount to specific forms of epistemic insensitivity: the inability to listen and to learn
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from  others,  the  inability  to  call  into  question  one’s  perspective  and  to  process
epistemic friction exerted from significantly different perspectives” (17-8). This lack of
knowledge for Medina is at the same time a lack of self-knowledge (of who I am as a
situated agent) and a lack of social knowledge (of social inequalities, and situations of
asymmetry and oppression). Here we can grasp the political relevance of an analysis of
social oppression and inequality developed in terms of epistemic conditions.
8 The book articulates these general theoretical assumptions in details. It proceeds first
to define the basic epistemological terminology adopted (chs. 1 and 2).  It  then puts
these  concepts  to  use  in  exploring  the  different  epistemic  dimensions  of  social
experience, providing specific emphasis to the moral and political implications of the
epistemic dimensions of silence and ignorance (chs. 3 and 4). It then proceeds to work
out  a  theoretical  model  of  epistemic  resistance  to  counter  present  forms  of  social
oppression (chs. 5 and 6). One of the central thesis that the book defends is that of a
reciprocal co-implication of the epistemic and the political. This thesis has two main
corollaries.  The first  is  the attribution of  moral  and political  meaning to  epistemic
states,  as  it  is  the  case  in  the  claim that  agent  bear  moral  responsibility  for  their
ignorance.  The  second  corollary  is  the  symmetrical  emphasis  on  the  epistemic
dimension of morality and politics, exemplified by the idea that morality and politics
are  rooted  in  specific  epistemic  virtues,  among  which  Medina  emphasized
“metalucidity.”
9 From  the  epistemic  perspective  adopted  by  Medina,  “inequality  is  the  enemy  of
knowledge.” As a consequence, social injustice and epistemic injustice are two faces of
the same coin. In a nutshell, the argument claims that oppression produces inequality;
inequality produces epistemic injustice, and epistemic injustice in turn impoverishes
our democratic life. According to Medina, while oppression is clearly asymmetrical, its
epistemic consequences affect both oppressors and oppressed, albeit not in the same
way. This point is strategic in Medina’s argumentation, because one of the conclusions
he  wants  to  bring  home is  that  epistemic  oppression  harms  oppressors  as  well,
producing  damages  that  according  to  studies  in  feminism  and  race  theory  can  be
conceptualized as specific forms of ignorance and epistemic vices. Among the vices that
privileged groups are likely to contract Medina lists  epistemic arrogance,  epistemic
laziness, and close-mindedness. These are epistemic vices because “they affect one’s
capacity  to  learn from others  and from the facts;  they inhibit  the capacity  of  self-
correction and of being open to corrections from others” (31). Symmetrically, Medina
identifies three epistemic virtues that tend to be associated with the social experience
produced by oppression: humility, curiosity/diligence, and open-mindedness. Medina
is clear in emphasizing that virtues and vices are not attributes of social groups but
correlates of experiences. The upshot of this analysis is that marginalized people may
have privileged access to social knowledge as they tend to develop a subversive lucidity
(defined as the sum of the three epistemic virtues) out of which they “are likely to
detect and overcome blind spots and to develop new forms of lucidity that can enrich
social cognition” (45). People belonging to oppressed groups are likely to gain “meta-
lucidity,” a “capacity to see the limitations of dominant ways of seeing. [...] This meta-
lucidity has a critical and subversive potential: it provides insights into the functioning
of perspectives that makes it possible to redraw our cognitive maps, to redescribe our
experiences, and to reconceptualize our ways of relating to others” (47).
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10 These are the theoretical bases of the analysis of the epistemic dimension of social life
on which Medina relies to invoke resistance as a moral and political virtue. Resistance
has a positive epistemic function because it provides friction, and friction is essential to
assure the alignment between our beliefs and attitudes and reality.  Our capacity to
resist received social schemes, ways of seeing and perceiving, and consolidated habits is
therefore transformed into a propeller of social change. And because in the last resort
each of us is responsible for her way of knowing, this claim provides the starting point
of  the  whole  normative  argument  Medina  develops  to  defend the  idea  that  agents
should  be  considered  morally  responsibility  for  their  beliefs  and epistemic  virtues,
which in turn implies the idea of a moral and political culpability for ignorance.
11 To explain Medina’s strategy we need to introduce a further specification: relying on
authors like Shannon Sullivan and Charles Mills, Medina emphasizes the tacit and often
unconscious dimension of virtues. To this extent he introduces the concept of “active
ignorance”  precisely  to  identify  a  form  of  ignorance  that  protects  itself  through
psychological  and  socio-political  mechanisms  of  defense.  He  equally  explores  how
social imaginaries contribute to the preservation of social ignorance by determining
the space of what is sayable and acceptable and what is not. What is socially thinkable
affects the epistemic credibility of a subject as it  tends to pre-define the discursive
space in which he will orient himself. Another concept he introduces to describe the
epistemic dimension of social oppression is that of “meta-blindness.” Meta-blindness is
the blindness to one’s own blindness, which therefore concurs to reinforce blindness.
The distinction between blindness and metablindness serves specific critical purposes
such as the critique of race-blind politics.
12 The  distinction  between  blindness  and  meta-blindness  serves  also  to  ground  the
detailed analysis of silencing as a social process through which oppression is created
and maintained. Following Miranda Frickers’ analysis of hermeneutical justice, that he
develops  and  expands  considerably,  Medina  insists  on  the  social  dimension  of  this
specific form of epistemic ignorance. Medina develops a pluralist approach to epistemic
injustice according to which a society is fragmented into interpretative communities,
so that injustices affect individuals according to the community they belong to. “Social
silences  and  hermeneutical  gaps  are  incorrectly  described  if  they  are  uniformly
predicated on an entire social context, instead of being predicated on particular ways
of inhabiting that context by particular people in relation to particular others” (90).
The long discussion of Frickers’ thesis is precisely aimed at providing an analysis of
epistemic injustices that takes social circumstances into account. This is an important
and original contribution Medina brings to the debate about the nature of epistemic
injustices.
13 It  is  indeed because  he  can show that  epistemic  injustices  have  a  social  basis  that
Medina can derive normative conclusions from his analysis. In particular, by relying on
analyses developed by Iris M. Young and Larry May, Medina introduces the idea of a
shared responsibilities for our epistemic weaknesses: “communities share a collective
responsibility to do everything they can to facilitate everyone’s ability to participate in
meaning-making and meaning-expressing practices” (109). Duties are proportional to
the degree of marginalization of the groups we interact with, so that responsibility will
have to be determined relationally and positionally: “whether individuals and groups
live up to their hermeneutical responsibilities has to be assessed by taking into account
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the forms of mutual positionality, relationality, and responsiveness (or lack thereof)
that these subjects and groups display with respect to one another.”
14 The normative requirement that Medina establishes through his analysis of the social
causes  of  epistemic  oppression  is  expressed  through  the  thesis  of  the  “cognitive
minimums”  that  opens  ch.  four.  The  cognitive  minimum  states  that  “responsible
agency requires that one be minimally knowledgeable about one’s mind and one’s life,
about the social world and the particular others with whom one interacts, and about
the empirical realities one encounters” (127). If one then admits that self-knowledge
can be attained only in the absence of systematic distortions and of cultivated forms of
blindness and ignorance, the normative argument in support of affirmative actions for
removing epistemic ignorance follows. Medina’s idea is that epistemic ignorance puts
agents  in  states  of  reduced  autonomy.  This  holds  for  oppressed  as  well  as  for
oppressors. “Systematic injustices produce irresponsible agents, for they tend to lack
knowledge of themselves, of others, and of the world” (131).
15 Given the connection between knowledge and responsibility, Medina explores at great
length  the  thesis  of  an  obligation  to  know  considered  as  the  reverse  of  a  moral
culpability of ignorance. Medina contends that there are specific forms of ignorance
which  are  not  excusable,  and  therefore  enables  to  identify  precise  forms  of
responsibilities: of agents, of educators, of communities. Given Medina’s contextualism,
the extent of an agent’s obligation to know is limited by the social and cultural horizon
of his experience. Medina identifies three criteria that may be used to prioritize our
obligations to know on which to rely to order our obligations according to a criteria of
relevance.  The  three  criteria  are:  (a)  a  maxim  to  prioritize  others  according  to
proximity, taking as a guideline the idea of sharing of resources and/or social spaces, of
being co-participant in social domains; (b) a maxim of openness and vigilance in always
trying to find out more about others; and (c) a maxim of shared responsibility between
community and individuals in determining relevance. These maxims are proposed as
guidelines  that  should  facilitate  individuals  and  communities  in  checking  the
appropriateness of their perceptions.
16 Chapters  five  and  six  present  the  most  constructive  part  of  the  argument,  where
Medina articulates his political vision of epistemic resistance as a sum of strategies
aimed  at  contrasting  and  overcoming  forms  of  social  oppression.  In  chapter  five
Medina  introduces  the  normative  concept  of  “meta-lucidity,”  identifying  what  he
describes as  the “epistemic heroes” whose everyday struggles contribute to restore
epistemic justice. This is the chapter where Medina engages most intensely with the
idea of an emancipatory role of the oppressed based on the epistemic virtues that they
have developed to survive to the manifold forms of social and epistemic oppression
they undergo.  In particular,  Medina relies on post-colonial  and feminist  thought to
emphasize  the  epistemic  distortion that  is  produced when racialized images  of  the
oppressed circulate in the social body: racial others are no more perceived in their own
identity but as the effect of a boomerang perception (Spelman): the white perceives the
racialized other only through the image he himself  has created,  projected onto the
other and received back. Epistemically, the experience of invisibility shows to agents
affected by it that social perception is fallible: because they see things others do not,
they become aware that there is always more to be seen than what is seen: they can
therefore develop the attitude of “being always on the lookout for more, forever more,
which is based on the experience that there can be more than what is seen” (192). Meta
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lucidity is an indispensable attitude for those that live in conditions of oppression if
they  want  to  maintain  epistemic  responsibility.  The  oppressed  are  epistemically
favored because their experience produces the clash of different perspectives,  what
W. E. B. du Bois called “double consciousness.” Double consciousness can bring with it
the capacity to shift between visions and therefore acquire critical capacity. But it can
also produce cognitive dissonance. Here Medina relies on Linda Alcoff’s project of a
transformative and reconstructive approach to white identity:  whites must learn to
accept the socio-historic genesis of their biased identity in order to transform it. The
central point is that discrimination and oppression are rooted in deep habits that are
difficult to undo. As a consequence, long processes of learning and transformation are
required.  “We  need  to  explore  ways  in  which  subjects  can  reconstruct  their
perspectives and learn to inhabit them in new ways, so that they can reconstitute their
positionality and relationality in a racialized social  environment” (220).  The overall
argument, to which we are already familiar, is that transformation requires friction
and resistance in order to disrupt consolidated habits.  In its turn, friction produces
awareness,  which  in  its  turn  favors  the  transformation  of  habits.  As  identities  are
socially shaped, processes of personal transformation are essentially social.
17 To make sense of the intrinsically social dimension of these processes Medina relies on
John Dewey’s theory of the publics and on G. H. Mead’s theory of the generalized other:
following Dewey Medina remarks that “a social network becomes an organized social
group or movement […] when and because its members engage in communication with
one  another  and  make  their  problems  interests,  and  goals  explicit”  (226).  Mead  is
invoked shortly after to defend a position of epistemic perspectivism: “the epistemic
friction produced by the interaction of heterogeneous standpoints can yield a critical
awareness of multiple ways of perceiving and can point in the direction of change, of
the melioration of our perceptual attitudes and habits.” Both references have to be
understood  with  reference  to  the  central  role  pragmatist  epistemology  assigns  to
friction as a distinctive feature of human experience. For Medina as well as for the
pragmatists friction is the starting point for changing habits. Friction can both disrupt
existing habits and foster the formation of new ones.
18 Still  from pragmatism Medina draws the idea that  social  transformation requires  a
transformation of social imagination. Imagination is crucial because it engages will and
is  therefore  closer  to  action  than  reason.  In  addition  imagination  is  positional:  it
concerns our relation in the world and to others.  Thirdly,  following Dewey Medina
emphasizes  the  experimental  and  creative  role  of  imagination:  “in  the  dramatic
imagination we explore  our  inhabitation of  possible  scenarios  that,  insofar  as  they
concern  forms  of  social  positionality  and  relationality,  call  for  moral  and  political
reactions” (256).  Hence the idea that  the interaction between social  imageries  may
favor processes of imaginative resistance. In fact, “imaginations with different moral
and  political  sensibilities  can  function  as  epistemic  counterpoints  to  each  other.”
Therefore,  “by comparing and contrasting their  imaginative resistances,  people can
become  sensitive  to  other  ways  of  imagining  and  inhabiting  worlds  of  possible
experiences” (256).
19 Imagination is favored by Medina also because it operates at the interface of individual
and society:  whereas it  is  always individuals that imagine,  they do it  by relying on
materials that are forged by social  relations.  A further element Medina draws from
pragmatism  to  develop  his  theory  of  resistant  imaginations  is  James’  pluralism:
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imagination  enables  us  to  see  the  meaningfulness  of  other’s  lives.  In  this  sense,
imaginative pragmatism is the habits of always seeing an alternative, of seeing things
in perspectives. Medina relies on James as against what he presents as a Peircean and
Meadian  conception  of  consensus  pluralism  to  defend  a  more  agonistic  view  of
pluralism  in  which  conflict  is  at  the  same  time  productive  and  never  solved.
Pragmatically,  he sees agreement as a temporary and instrumental  achievement:  in
social  life as well  as in political  practice unification is searched only for matters of
action, not truth: “the possibilities for epistemic friction and resistance are qualified
and constrained for the sake, not of consensus and unification, but of coordination and
cooperation” (283). This pragmatic understanding of pluralism is then radicalized by
relying on a foucaultian conception of power to introduce a conception of “guerrilla
pluralism”  in  which  epistemic  friction  is  now seen  merely  as  a  form of  resistance
against  oppression.  Friction is  sought  for  its  own sake.  The goal  is  not  to  increase
knowledge  but  resistance  to  power.  Guerrilla  pluralism  does  not  seek  to  resolve
conflicts  but  to  energize  them.  Medina  goes  at  great  length  in  describing  and
comparing these competing views of pluralism, proposing in the end a combination of
both  which  praises  Foucault’s  disruptive  force  and  James’  creative  potential.  In
conclusion, it is by relying on a cultivation of epistemic virtues, by denouncing so far
still  unrecognized  forms  of  culpable  ignorance  and  by  fostering  new  resistant
imaginaries that Medina proposes a normative account of how social oppression can be
contrasted and reduced.
20 All  in  all,  José  Medina  has  written  an  original  book  which  masterfully  combines
continental  and  American  traditions  and  which  addresses  important  topics  in
contemporary  social and  political  philosophy,  showing  why  we  should  pay  more
attention to the epistemic dimension of  our everyday interactions.  In this way,  the
volume offers a new and fresh interpretation of the foucauldian adage that “knowledge
is power,” one in which the creative and constraining forces that shape our everyday
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